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Negotiating a cold war 
Merleau-Ponty and his plea for humanistic humanities 
In modernity, nature is bifurcated, there is a deep separation between the knowing subject and the 
known object, between realism and intellectualism. At first sight, these presuppositions are no big 
problem in natural sciences. But in the social sciences problems immediately arise. In the domain of 
philosophy of social sciences there was a strong reaction throughout the twentieth century against such 
‘isms’. 
How to overcome this problem? Because the sociological observer is himself part of the research 
object, Bourdieu (1996) suggests an ethnological detour. Merleau-Ponty takes a different stance. For 
him it is not a problem of how we do science: his critique is neither a second order observation that 
stresses on the way the divide is made, nor a constructivist realism indicating that doing social 
sciences is performative. According to Merleau-Ponty, in contemporary social sciences there is 
something lost that has to be recovered.  
In this paper, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty wants to ‘save’ a humanistic approach to the humanities. 
He wants to indicate the problematic assumptions and the hereby ‘presupposed worlds’ of both realism 
and intellectualism. 
With his critique he wants to overcome the problems present in the common truth conceptions. 
Merleau-Ponty refuses to reduce truth to ‘correlated knowledge of human properties’ and 
acknowledges the fundamental corporeal aspects of the human existence. Hereby truth becomes 
elusive. The common styles of thinking and ‘doing science’ presuppose a world lacking the key 
concepts of the other pole, viz. ‘immeasurable’ meaning or ‘disturbing’ materiality. These 
presuppositions violate Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of the human embodied and 
sense-making subject. 
First of all, Merleau-Ponty reacts against realism, which is (still) dominant in the so-called humanities. 
Realism has a deterministic view of (social) reality, wherein causal relations react on specific 
measurable properties of man. This positivist conception of social sciences is amoral, meaningless, 
deterministic and takes the own position as the only possible. Man becomes a insignificant 
‘manipulandum’. On the other hand Merleau-Ponty thinks that philosophical intellectualism is not a 
sufficient response for restoring meaning and human experience. The subject of intellectualism is 
disconnected from his disturbing body. This conception of man is ‘without ground’. 
Both realism and intellectualism deny the other pole of the dualism and neglect hereby their 
interconnectedness. According to Merleau-Ponty, philosophy and social science presuppose each 
other. Both styles of thinking forgot their interconnectedness. They are at cold war, because ‘they 
agree upon a delimitation of boundaries which assures them of never meeting’. Merleau-Ponty wants 
to acknowledge this interconnectedness again by making them both possible in a humanistic way. 
By acknowledging the specificity of Merleau-Ponty’s critique against both realism and intellectualism 
we can better understand what is at stake in a humanistic philosophy of the social sciences.  
